Must doctors save their patients?
John Harris Department ofEducation, University ofManchester Author's abstract Do doctors and other medical staffhave an obligation to treat those who need their help? Thispaper assumes no legal or contractual obligations but attempts to discover whether there is any general moral obligation to treat those in need. In particular the questions ofwhether or not the obligation thatfalls on medical staffis differentfrom that ofothers and ofwhether doctors are more blameworthy than others ifthey fail to treat patients are examined. Finally we look at the question of the burden ofthis obligation and at the responsibility ofsociety to mitigate its hardships. ' There is a question here which needs discussion: whether, when and why a doctor has an obligation to do anything for someone? Can't a doctor sometimes say: "I do not want to treat this patient, I actually don't want him as a patient of mine?" Can he sometimes, or can he never say the following?: "I do not want to prolong this person's life by taking medical measures to do so. I am not saying it is better not to; I would say nothing against another practitioner who might want to. But I don't want to. And I don't have to".' This question of G E M Anscombe's (1) she rightly identifies as 'a deep and important question of medical ethics', and it is this question, or rather these questions that I wish to attempt to answer here.
A proper answer to them may well prove to be an answer to the very general and much larger question: what is our obligation to care for one another? Or, scarcely narrower, what is society's obligation to care for and protect its citizens? With these possibilities in mind we will try to maintain a sharp focus and talk for the most part of doctors, nurses and other medical staff (2). Here Professor Anscombe identifies two questions: the first is the question of whether or not there is any obligation to do something in the way of medical treatment for others and the second is whether there can be any obligation to do something 'medical' to prolong the life ofanother person. What is 'medical' treatment?
Before looking at these questions, however, we must ask what is implied by the use of the term 'medical' to qualify what is or is not done for other people. Much of the 'treatment' offered by doctors is simply advice as to diet, rest, exercise, cleanliness and so on or, it may even be general advice about the probable effects of a particular lifestyle. This advice of course, may well prolong life. Where more palpable treatment is offered, say in the form of 'drugs', the question of what is specially 'medical' about the treatment is just as problematic. The drugs may be proven therapies, appropriately prescribed, they may or may not help. They may be placebos, given to the sick in the absence of anything proved to be more efficacious, or they may be given to hypochondriacs; either group may consequently recover or they may not. The treatment may be major surgery or it may be 'nursing care only'. Because of the wide variety of activities or absences of activity which may be described as 'treatment' and because of the wild variation in probable, expected or hoped for, actual or imagined success, indeed because of the great difficulty ofdefining 'success', it is difficult in the extreme to define medical treatment in terms of any of these. I shall in consequence take 'medical treatment' to refer to anything done or deliberately left undone by doctors or other medical staff, or at their direction, to or for people who either offer themselves for such treatment or who are in such a state that it seems sensible to call on doctors for help or to or for people who are presented perforce for such help.
which are not death-postponing are not,morally speaking, very important indeed. But while the prolongation of life is not necessarily or always more important than that of giving the other sorts of help that may be required, it is always of the first importance, and except in very rare cases, the saving of life, or the attempt so to do, is the first and most urgent requirement. So while we may want to rank-order the multifarious varieties of care and other treatment that doctors may perform, there is no need to grade the importance ofsaving life.
There may then be a fairly systematic difference in our judgments about the importance of medical treatment which does not save or prolong life and that which does; and this may well influence our judgments about the force of whatever obligation there may be to give treatment, or even our judgment as to whether or not there is any such obligation at all. To avoid this further complication of our investigation we will concentrate on those cases which are always of the first importance and so on Professor Anscombe's second question: Is there an obligation to prolong life by taking medical measures so to do?
Refusing patients and refusing treatment Can a doctor say of a dying patient 'I do not want to treat this patient, I actually don't want him as a patient of mine?' There are two possibilities here: i) that a doctor refuses to accept someone as her patient, ii) that she refuses to treat one of her patients. How different are these and do they indicate different possible obligations on the part ofthe doctor?
Superficially the difference between these two possibilities is that in the first instance a doctor refuses to take responsibility for someone, refuses to ascertain whether or not he or she needs her help and whether or not she can or cannot do anything for that person. In the second instance she takes, or somehow has responsibility for the patient, and refuses to discharge that responsibility. In a society which has many doctors (even if the 'many' are in fact a scarcity) refusal to accept someone as a patient may just mean that some other doctor will (will have to?) accept him. Similarly, refusal to treat will just mean that some other doctor will (will have to?) treat him. There may of course be a long line of such doctors but we must concentrate on the doctor at the end of the line, or on the doctor who, for a particular patient (for example, because that patient will not survive being moved along to the next practitioner) is the doctor at the end of the line. The doctors up the line have passed on the responsibility for the patient, but they have also passed on whatever force there is in the obligation of doctors to treat the sick. This force can only be fully felt at the point where a person's fate hangs upon whether or not he gets the treatment he needs here and now from this doctor. Now, if you are that doctor the consequences for the patient of your saying 'I do not want to treat this patient' are the same as saying 'I . . . don't want him as a patient of mine'. Of course, you, the doctor, may not know that they are the same, indeed, if you refuse to take on the patient you may effectively shield yourself from any knowledge of his condition let alone of his fate. This may or may not affect moral assessments of your character and we will return to this point, but for now it is important to stress that this makes no difference to the patient. In both cases the patient will die and he will die because you refused to treat him. This may be a controversial conclusion but I think it is an inescapable one, and it is worth taking time out to indicate why this is so. The argument is a large one but its force can be shown fairly briefly (3).
Decisions can be decisive In these examples, of course, the patients have been admitted to hospital and so in a sense the hospital has taken responsibility for them, has accepted that there is an obligation to treat them. Is it not therefore the breach of this obligation that makes it the case that if the patients die their deaths will be a result of the failure to treat? Moreover, might it not be argued that this case cannot be used in illustration of the causal connection between a decision not to treat and its 'consequences' because to do so would beg the question of whether there is any such obligation and this is precisely the question we are investigating? This objection is not well founded for we can clearly see the causal connection between failure to treat and death quite independently ofthe existence ofany obligation to treat.
Firstly, suppose that as a result of our deliberations here we firmly conclude that doctors have in fact no moral or other obligation to treat patients. Our reaching this conclusion would not prevent us from seeing that the diabetic and haemorrhaging patients we have imagined died because they were not given the treatment that would keep them alive. We would understand very well that this was the reason for their deaths but accept, presumably, that it is not morally wrong to cause death in circumstances like these. How plausible a judgment this might be is, of course, a question to which we will shortly return. A further and perhaps clearer illustration is the case of so called 'selective treatment' where doctors give instructions that 'nursing care only' be given to, inter alia, severely handicapped children. This involves among many other restrictions on treatment, the decision not to give antibiotics to cure any infection the child may contract. If the child becomes infected it is well understood to be much more likely to die if antibiotics are withheld, and our understanding of the connexion between the doctor's decision and the death of the child is not dependent on any judgment about this involving a breach of any duty to care: because those involved, who well appreciate the consequences of their decisions, judge these decisions to be fully consistent with their duty to treat their patients caringly, properly and professionally.
We cannot then avoid the conclusion that if a doctor refuses to treat a patient, who in the circumstances only that doctor can save, then the death will be a consequence of that refusal. But is the doctor morally obliged not to refuse? Again, we are interested here in the question of what moral obligations there are which derive purely from one party being a doctor and the other needing her help. Many doctors would have all sorts of contractual obligations in such circumstances and, irrespective of the legal status of these, there will also perhaps be moral obligations to honour contracts. But our interest is concentrated entirely on the question ofmoral obligation per se.
What is a doctor's business?
It is sometimes said that saving life is always a doctor's business, that is what she is trained for, it is her vocation. This, while perhaps uncontroversial, is too weak a consideration upon which to found moral obligation. For playing cricket is always a cricketer's business (if indeed it can be so described), it is what he is trained for, it is his vocation. But that does not mean that he is obliged to play in every match, or every time someone turns up wishing to see him play. Perhaps this analogy misses an important point, that medicine is special, and its specialness consists simply in its role in saving life and in healing or caring for health and in the special priority we give to all these things.
First and of course, we do attach special importance to prolonging life and to recovering from illness and injury and to relief of pain. We attach the same importance to the avoidance of subjection to involuntary and substantial risks to life and health and to the risk of being subjected to pain. However, it would be odd to think that there was some special category of person whose unique and first responsibility it was to refrain from killing or injuring us or from subjecting us to substantial risk of death or injury or pain. No one at all should subject us to these or the risk of them. Similarly, and for the same reasons, anyone who can should save or help save our lives and preserve our health.
But wouldn't a doctor be specially blameworthy if, knowing how incompetent a physician she was, she allowed a patient to die rather than risk the disgrace of muffing a simple life-saving procedure? She would, moreover, be more blameworthy than would a lay bystander who happened to know the appropriate procedure but was unwilling to risk employing it; just as an incompetent lifeguard would be more to blame for failing to rescue a drowning man than would another competent swimmer who also witnessed the drowning. It is important here not to confuse the moral assessment ofcharacter with the moral assessment ofactions. Take the case of a completely innocent man. No one at all should murder him and everyone's obligation not to do so is equally strong. However, if his son were to murder him we might think the son more wicked than we would a murderous stranger. This does not mean, however, that his son was under a stronger moral obligation not to murder him than was the stranger, nor that his murder was more to be deplored in the one case than in the other. In each case the murder was equally bad and the obligation to refrain from it equally strong -only our moral assessment of the character of the murderer differs. Similarly, we may think the doctor and the lifeguard more to blame for their moral cowardice than were the others, but not that their obligation was stronger nor that the victim was more wronged by one ofthem than by any other.
Two faces ofthe obligation to treat
There are then two sorts of moral obligation here, or rather, as I see it, two ways of thinking about one and the same obligation. I won't enquire where this obligation comes from because in one or other of its forms it is almost universally recognised. For our present purposes we will have gone a long way towards making clear the nature of the moral obligations of medical staff if we can show that they fall under one or other aspect ofthis more general and widely recognised duty.
According to the first way of thinking about this duty it is part of our duty to refrain from killing or injuring others. Because, as we have seen, where we decide not to treat someone knowing that he will die as a consequence, or decide not to rescue someone knowing that she will die as a consequence, then in both cases we are responsible for their deaths (4).
The 
Saving life is a moral issue
The second important feature of the obligations of medical staff made clearer by seeing those obligations as the same as those which fall on the rest of us, is that medical staffhave no special prerogatives in the interpretation of that obligation. In deciding, for example, who should and who should not be the beneficiary of their power to rescue, doctors have no special status because such a decision is a moral and not a medical or clinical one. Of course, medical opinion may well be an important part of the data used to come to a moral decision, just as the opinion of a mine engineer may well be an important part of the data upon which to base a decision as to whether or not to rescue trapped miners. But the decision, although perhaps taken by engineers, will be a moral and not an engineering decision. This point is perhaps worth labouring slightly since doctors are very apt to claim that only they can decide these cases, firstly because such decisions are supposedly 'medical' and secondly because it is they who will have to carry through whatever decision is taken. We have seen that such decisions are not in fact medical decisions in the sense that doctors have any special competence to make them or any right to exclusivity in making them. The second point is even less well taken. It would be like a hangman claiming that it is he who must decide the guilt or innocence of the accused because it is he who will have to carry out the sentence.
There is undoubtedly more to be said here, although I think not a great deal more. In any event we must now turn to the question of what if any exceptions there are to, or constraints there are upon, the very general obligation on us all to rescue those in peril oftheir lives.
Exceptions
Given what is at stake, when might anyone at all say 'I don't want to and I don't have to' save the life of another person? Clearly there would have to be something which could plausibly be claimed to be of comparable moral importance at stake or some other equally forceful moral consideration that would show why one shouldn't save (or one should end) this life in these circumstances. The answer would thus seem to be: not unless eithera) It is probable that I would suffer significant injury (or death) or undergo great hardship in the attempt or as a result ofit; or b) There is something ofcomparable (or greater) moral importance I must do and I cannot do both; or c) It would be better for that person if I did not attempt to save him or some other good would be achieved by his death, or by my refraining from saving him, for which end I would be justified in sacrificing his life; or d) The person does not want to be saved; or e) The person would be better offdead. Conditions 'c', 'd'and 'e' are Conditions 'a' and 'b' , on the other hand, both involve cases in which the potential victim's life should undoubtedly be saved but the potential rescuer believes that there are moral reasons why he or she should not be, or need not be, the rescuer. In these two cases there need be no judgment that it would be better for anyone ifthe victim were not saved, only that particular people are not required, in these circumstances, to do the saving.
We will take the last three conditions first and look at them just long enough to see the sorts of cases to which they would apply. We will then turn in more detail to the first two conditions because it is these to which doctors must appeal if they are ever to decline to treat the generality ofpatients.
In what circumstances would condition 'c' apply? I suppose it would be better for someone if I didn't attempt to save him if either, he would be better off dead (see 'e' below) or the process of saving him would either be so painful and protracted for him that death would be preferable to experiencing it, or his rescue would involve the sacrifice of some other value that he believed to be more important than his own life, as perhaps is the case when Jehovah's Witnesses require, but refuse, blood transfusions. Where some other good would allegedly be achieved by the death of the person I could save, it must be the sort of scale of good for which I would be justified in sacrificing his life. Some will hold that this could never be the case but I suppose most of us would accept that saving one or more other lives which could only be saved if this person were left to die would be an example. Another might be using the resources required to rescue certain individuals to prevent the certain occurrence of a greater number of deaths from another danger.
How we respond to the request ofthose under condition 'd' that they not be saved will depend very much upon whether we judge 'the value of life' to be primarily a value to the person whose life it is or of some independent importance; or perhaps, upon whether we accept that an individual must be free to determine his or her own fate even at the cost of his or her own life. Broadly, those who think suicides should be left alone will accede to such requests and those who think they should be prevented and/or revived will not. The working out of this dilemma is not my present task but at least we can understand someone's finding the fact that a person has sincerely and soberly asked not to be saved, a morally compelling reason for allowing him to die.
Condition 'e' is both important and problematic. It is important for this discussion because where doctors have judged that it is in their patients' best interests to die they have felt supported in their decisions to let patients die by the belief that they are in any event under no compelling obligation to provide treatment (7). It is problematic because of the difficulty in being satisfied that it is in a patient's best interests to die, particularly when, either through disability or infancy, the patient cannot himself be consulted. Some will claim that we can never come to such a conclusion, others will be able to imagine cases in which they would feel that it would be better for someone fare are to be neglected so that resources may be devoted to saving lives, there will inevitably be a delayed feedback effect and the lack ofthese provisions will begin to cost lives. Those who hold that certain values are incommensurable face a different difficulty. Since deciding what to do is inescapable in a way that deciding what to value is not, they will have to choose to do one thing rather than another while maintaining that this does not commit them to any judgment about the greater absolute value of what they have chosen as compared with the rejected alternatives.
For the other difficulties it is not necessary that we have a comprehensive or even a well worked out system of priorities that we can rank-order with confidence; nor do we need a foolproof method of calculating probabilities or resolving uncertainties, though all or any of these would be useful. However, ifanyone is to decline to save the life ofanother person because there is something else he must do instead, then if he is to retain any moral credit at all he must be able to give a plausible (though not necessarily a decisive) account of how the moral importance of his alternative project compares with that of saving a life. Or, given the probability of saving a particular life that there is a better way to use time or resources. If he maintains that values are incommensurable then he must still justify his choosing to do one thing rather than another.
Sharing the burden
If we return now to the problem of how these conditions apply to the obligations of medical staff a number of apparently special problems apply. The sorts of cases conjured up by thinking ofthe obligation as a perfectly general one to save life where we can, tempt us to imagine rather exceptional circumstances in which we find ourselves with the opportunity to save life and readily recognise the lameness of saying 'I can't save that child from drowning I've not finished my tea'. Medical staff are presented with life-saving opportunities rather more often than most of us imagine that we are. These apparently special problems are all to do with how burdensome a business life-saving is, or might be, for particular individuals. I say they are apparently special because we all of us have more of such opportunities and therefore more of a burden than we imagine (3), but I will concentrate just on the case of doctors and on how the burden which falls on them is to be shared between them and the members of the society ofwhich they are a part.
Let's suppose that the last doctor happens to be the only doctor, because say, she is first on the scene of a huge disaster and no help can be expected for a long while. In those circumstances so long as her skills are essential to life it is clearly her moral obligation to provide them. She cannot insist on normal office hours, or that she is in vacation time or that she has decided as of now to give up medicine for a career in television. But this seems reasonable only in an emergency. The burden of such unremitting life-saving might be too great to bear on a long-term basis, at least if all the burden fell on one individual.
Suppose a particular doctor always found herself as the last doctor because her colleagues played elaborate games of 'pass the patient' and consistently cheated so that when the music stopped she was always left holding the baby. We would think it unjust that this doctor must devote twenty-four hours a day to caring for the sick when her colleagues merely shared the burden of minding the gramophone. But here our judgment would not be that there was no obligation, rather that the obligation should be fairly distributed. So that although, with exceptions already noted, the last doctor is obliged to treat her patients rather than let them die, there is also an obligation on the rest of us to see to it that the burden (even if it isn't a burden?) of being the last doctor is shared equally or at least fairly.
Scarcity ofdoctors
More common than being the only available doctor will be the situation of doctors in a society which has insufficient doctors. We would say, I think, that a society is short of doctors when -if the burden of treating those who need care were to be spread fairly through the population of practising doctors -a doctor could not, under those circumstances, discharge her obligation to the sick or dying without either working significantly harder than people in that society normally work or without hardship to herself. A society will thus be short of doctors in this sense even where perhaps some doctors are unemployed or otherwise present but unable to practise. Well, where doctors are in short supply they will clearly have a hard time of it if they are to rescue all those who need to be and could be saved. But unless this hard time is so hard as to bring it under condition 'a' then their obligation to save life remains. But we must remember that this obligation falls equally on anyone and everyone who could help, and while it ny be that only medically qualified people can help those in immediate danger there is something that the rest of us can do to help as well. We can provide the resources that will remove the scarcity of doctors (8) dying. So that while the obligation of doctors to rescue those they can rescue is not lessened by the burden of the task (unless that burden amounts to grave hardship) it would be wrong to think that doctors are morally worse for not working much harder as a matter ofcourse than other members ofthe society.
And of course, where doctors are not in short supply they seem clearly obliged to help the dying unless conditions 'a' to 'e' apply, even if this involves occasional emergencies where much harder work than normal is required.
We have concentrated on saving life as the clearest and most important obligation to our fellows. Whether the same arguments can be applied to the general question of the obligation to provide all the various things that count as medical care is less clear. It may well be that we could make rough but workable judgments as to the importance of each sort of treatment, and 'pro rata' judgments about the importance of alternative projects that those who could provide the care might wish to undertake. Many injuries, illnesses and conditions which are not lethal may, to those who suffer from them, be a fate almost as bad as death (and perhaps sometimes worse). Here the obligation to cure or heal if possible and to relieve terrible pain may be clearly as important as saving life or postponing death. In other cases day to day medical care may be a fairly low personal and social priority, and the obligation to provide it weak or even non-existent. Ofcourse, it may sometimes (or always?) be necessary to see patients to decide which is which, and the obligation to assess may be much more comprehensive than the general obligation to treat. How all these problems are to be resolved will require much more detailed study than can be given here.
We should note finally that special difficulties will arise when a particular society, community or state cannot afford all the doctors (let alone all the other medical resources) it needs, however hard the people work. taking on a patient who needs his care and perhaps cannot find another doctor: it is surely only reasonable for him not to enter into a contract which he has not got the resources to honour except by dishonouring another contract with someone whose claim is prior. But it would be only decent to render whatever first aid might appear to be needed and at least to attempt to direct the disappointed patient elsewhere. This is not, in fact, a situation that very often arises, even in countries where physicians are thin on the ground; mostly we manage as best we can and do what we have to do; but the decision is ours and no one, moral philosopher or bureaucrat, has the right to impose on us. Nor is it something that patients themselves seem to expect. All this fits reasonably well into a morality based on 'do as you would be done by' in the subtlest sense; and, ofcourse, by taking up medicine as a career, physicians in a sense abjure fatalism and commit themselves to making the best of things in the here and now, whatever their eschatology. I should add that by joining a profession with moral traditions of its own, doctors often find themselves living up to higher standards than they would otherwise profess to observe, just as more courage is expected of professional soldiers than we ask of ourselves in civilian life. In this respect we ask more of ourselves than ordinary morality would have the right to exact; and it is for this reason that the public rightly prefers, on the whole, to consult members ofthe medical profession rather than mountebanks about their bodily ills. But this raises other issues to which perhaps John Harris will address himself if this debate continues.
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